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SECURITIES ASPECTS OF TAX REORGANIZATIONS
Steven K. Cochran*
A tax reorganization, hereafter referred to individually by the ap-
propriate identifying letter used in the 1954 Internal Revenue Code,
is defined as any one of the following transactions:
(A) a statutory merger or consolidation;'
(B) the acquisition by one corporation, in exchange solely for all or
a part of its voting stock, of stock of another corporation if, immedi-
ately after the acquisition, the acquiring corporation has control of such
other corporation (whether or not such acquiring corporation had con-
trol immediately before the acquisition) ;'
(C) the acquisition by one corporation, in exchange solely for all or
part of its voting stock (or in exchange solely for all or a part of the
voting stock of a corporation which is in control of the acquiring cor-
poration), of substantially all of the properties of another corporation,
but in determining whether the exchange is solely for stock the assump-
tion by the acquiring corporation of a liability of the other, or the fact
that property acquired is subject to a liability, shall be disregarded;8
(D) a transfer by a corporation of all or a part of its assets to an-
other corporation if immediately after the transfer the transferor, or
one or more of its shareholders (including persons who were share-
holders immediately before the transfer), or any combination thereof,
is in control of the corporation to which the assets are transferred; but
* B.S., University of Oklahoma; LL.B., Southern Methodist University.
'Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 368(a) (1) (A). This definition refers to a merger or
consolidation effected pursuant to the corporation laws of the United States or a state or
territory or the District of Columbia. Treas. Reg. § 1.368-2 (1955). In a strict sense, a
merger is a union effected by the absorbing of one or more existing corporations by another
which survives and continues the combined business; a consolidation is the uniting of two
or more existing corporations to form a new corporation. Ballantine, Corporations 680-81
(rev. ed. 1946).
aInt. Rev. Code of 1954, § 368(a) (1) (B).
For purposes of . . . this part, the term "control" means the ownership of
stock possessing at least 80 per cent of the total combined voting power of
all classes of stock entitled to vote and at least 80 per cent of the total
number of shares of all other classes of stock of the corporation. Int. Rev.
Code of 1954, § 368(c).
It is not necessary that control be acquired as a result of the type B exchange so long
as such control exists immediately after the exchange. In the type B reorganization, the
requirement that acquisition be made "solely" in exchange for the acquiring corporation's
voting stock has been strictly interpreted by the courts. Helvering v. Southwest Consol.
Corp., 315 U.S. 194 (1942).
'Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 368(a)(1)(C). Unlike a type B reorganization, the
"solely" in exchange for voting stock requirement of a type C reorganization may be met
even though cash or other property is given in addition to the acquiring corporation's
stock. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 368 (a) (2).
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only if, in pursuance of the plan, stock or securities of the corporation
to which the assets are transferred are distributed in a transaction which
qualifies under section 354, 355, or 356;'
(f) a recapitalization; ors
(F) a mere change in identity, form or place of organization, how-
ever effected.'
These provisions form the framework within which a reorganiza-
tion must be constructed in order to qualify for non-recognition of
gain or loss in that transaction. In addition to complying strictly'
with the Internal Revenue Code, a reorganization must comply with
certain administrative and judicial doctrines which have been super-
imposed upon the statute. These include the well-known "business
purpose,'" . continuity of interest,"' and "step transaction"'" doc-
trines which are presently applicable and necessary to consider.
It is not difficult to see that each of these transactions will quite
likely entail an issuance of securities in exchange for securities or
properties received. Thus, in any tax reorganization the parties must
ascertain the applicability of the various federal securities acts" and
determine the impact of each upon that particular reorganization.
'Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 368(a)(1)(D). Where a reorganization may qualify as
either type C or type D the transaction must he treated as a type D exchange. Int. Rev.
Code of 1954, § 368(a) (2) (A). In order to qualify as a type D reorganization an exchange
must comply with S§ 354, 355, or 356. Section 354 requires that the transferor corporation
transfer substantially all of its assets and then distribute the stock and securities it receives
to its stockholders. This section is designed to control only combination D reorganizations
and is inapplicable to corporate divisions. Section 355 provides for a tax free distribution
in devisive reorganizations such as spin-offs, split-offs, and split-ups. The benefits of this
section apply only to distributions or exchanges in which the controlled and controlling
corporations continue to carry on a business which was in existence for at least five years
before the exchange and where only stocks or securities are distributed. Section 356
comes into play if the distribution would have qualified under § 354 or S 355 but for the
dispersal of "other property or money." All devisive reorganizations must qualify under
S 355 to be nontaxable at the shareholder level.
s Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 368(a) (1) (E). Recapitalization is a vague term which
has not been expressly defined by Congress or the Supreme Court. In Helvering v. Southwest
Consol. Corp., 315 U.S. 194, 202 (1942), the Court would venture no further than to
deem it a "reshuffling of a capital structure, within the framework of an existing
corporation. . . " A recapitalization has also been defined as "an agreement of all stock-
holders and creditors to change and increase the capitalization or debts of the corporation
or both." 3 Mertens, Federal Income Taxation 72 (1942).
'Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 368(a) (1) (F).
'Treas. Reg. § 1.368-2(a) (1955).
' Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
'LeTulle v. Scofield, 308 U.S. 415 (1940); Pinellas Ice & Storage Co. v. Commissioner,
287 U.S. 462 (1933).
l"Helvering v. Elkhorn Coal Co., 95 F.2d 732 (4th Cir. 1937), cert. denied, 305 U.S.
605 (1938).
" This paper will discuss the applicability of the Securities Act of 1933, 48 Star. 74,
as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1958) (hereinafter referred to as the "Securities Act")
and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Star. 881, as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-hh-1
(1958) (hereinafter referred to as the "Exchange Act"). These acts will hereinafter be
cited by sections of the act.
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Because the burden and expense of complying with these laws and
the effect of the disclosure requirements upon corporate policies are
often quite substantial, the type of reorganization which is to be
utilized must be selected with care. It is the purpose of this Com-
ment to examine these transactions in light of the securities acts and
to ascertain and analyze the more important securities problems that
may appear.
I. THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933
A. The "No Sale" Theory And Rule 133
The Securities Act of 1933 was enacted to compel disclosure of
facts which would enable investors to purchase securities with full
knowledge of pertinent information about the issuer. For purposes
of tax reorganization, the most important provision of the act is
section 5, which requires registration of securities sold or offered
for sale by use of the mails or in interstate commerce by issuers,
underwriters, or dealers, unless a specific exemption from registra-
tion is available. However, unless a securities transaction involves a
tsale" or an "offer to sell," ' 3 it is not covered by the act, and the
security itself need not be registered.
In 1935 the Securities and Exchange Commission restricted the
scope of the term "sale." The Commission took the position that "no
sale" to stockholders of a corporation is involved in a statutory
merger, consolidation, or sale of assets among corporations where,
pursuant to statutory or charter provisions, a vote of a required ma-
jority operates to authorize the transaction and to bind all stock-
holders except for statutory appraisal rights of dissenters." This
declaration was contrary to an earlier position taken by the Federal
Trade Commission" and to the legislative history of the Securities
Act. "
The theory was initially embodied in a note to the form that was
then used for registration of securities. It remained substantially
" Securities Act § 5.
" Securities Act § 2(3): The terms "sale" or "sell" include "every contract of sale or
disposition of a security . . . for value. The term 'offer to sell', 'offer for sale', or 'offer'
shall include every attempt or offer to dispose of, or solicitation of an offer to buy, a
security . . . for value."
" SEC Securities Act Release No. 493, Sept. 20, 1935.
" See Letter to Chester T. Lane, Esq., p. 3, attached to SEC Securities Act Release No.
3762, March 15, 1957.
"6See H.R. Rep. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 11, 16 (1933) providing: "The term 'sale'
or 'sell' is defined broadly to include every attempt or offer to dispose of a security for
value." (Emphasis added.) See also 1 Loss, Securities Regulation 519 (2d ed. 1961) dis-
cussing H.R. Rep. No. 85 with reference to the present § 3(a) (10) of the Securities Act
and implying that corporate reorganizations of the type discussed are covered by the
statute unless specifically exempted.
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intact until 1947 when the Commission rescinded the form and
omitted the "no sale" note from its replacement." In spite of its
rescission the Commission continued to apply the rule on a case-by-
case"9 basis until 19511" when it was formally codified into Rule
133." The codified rule extended the scope of the "no sale" theory
and further restricted the term "sale" by removing reclassifications
from the definition of that term. A further extension occurred in
19541 when the Commission, in a move to conform the rule to the
Internal Revenue Code,2 amended it to embrace transactions in
which assets of one corporation are transferred to another corpora-
tion in exchange for voting stock of a third corporation which is in
control of the transferee. Finally, as a result of litigation" arising
from the rule, the Commission, after an unfruitful attempt in 1956,24
amended it in 1959 to its present form.2
The rationale upon which the Commission based its concept of
the "no sale" theory is that in these "situations the alteration of the
stockholder's security occurs not because he consents individually to
an exchange but because the corporation by authorized corporate
action converts his security from one form to another." 6 This
premise-that the transaction involves a corporate rather than an
individual act-has found few friends among legal commentators. 7
It gained sustenance, however, in National Supply Co. v. Leland
Stanford Univ.2s where a court of appeals, although not resting its
decision upon the "no sale" theory, deferred to the amicus brief of
the Commission which advocated its application and, in effect, thereby
adopted it.2" The theory has not since been challenged in the courts.
Another aspect of the "no sale" theory which has received heavy
17 SEC Securities Act Release No. 3211, April 14, 1947.
'8 Purcell, A Consideration of the No-Sale Theory Under the Securities Act of 1933,
24 Brooklyn L. Rev. 254, 260 (1958).
19 SEC Securities Act Release No. 3420, Aug. 2, 1951.
2 5SEC Rule 133, 17 C.F.R. § 230.133 (Supp. 1962).
21 SEC Securities Act Release No. 3522, Oct. 26, 1954.
22 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 368(a) (1) (C). See discussion note 3 supra.
23 SEC v. Micro-Moisture Controls, Inc., 148 F. Supp. 558 (S.D.N.Y. 1957) (preliminary
injunction), 167 F. Supp. 716 (S.D.N.Y. 1958) (permanent injunction), aff'd sub nom.
SEC v. Culpepper, 270 F.2d 241 (2d Cir. 1959); Great Sweet Grass Oils, Ltd., 37 S.E.C.
683 (1957), aff'd per curiam, Great Sweet Grass Oils, Ltd. v. SEC, 256 F.2d 893 (D.C. Cir.
1958); see Proposed SEC Rule 133--Comments of Committee on Federal Regulation of
Securities, 14 Bus. Law. 423 (1959).
24 See 1 Loss, Securities Regulation 528 (2d ed. 1961).
25 SEC Securities Act Release No. 4115, July 16, 1959.
26 See 1 Loss, op. cit. supra note 24, at 521.
27 See, e.g., Sargent, A Review of the "No-Sale" Theory of Rule 133, 13 Bus. Law. 78
(1957).
29 National Supply Co. v. Leland Stanford Univ., 134 F.2d 689 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
320 U.S. 773 (1943), reversing 46 F. Supp. 389 (N.D. Cal. 1942).
29 Id. at 694.
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criticism is the inconsistency which arises from the fact that for
purposes of registration and prospectus requirements a reorganiza-
tion transaction may not involve a sale, while for almost all other
securities regulation purposes it does."0 For example, a sale may be
involved in a reorganization exchange for purposes of Rule lob-5
and section 16(b) of the Exchange Act,"1 and quite clearly a sale
is involved for purposes of sections 12 and 17 of the Securities Act."
Also troublesome has been the concept that a Rule 133 transaction,
although not involving a sale, may very well involve a purchase of
securities."
Some rather legalistic attempts have been made to justify these
anomalies but thus far with little success." An entirely supportable
justification is that the reorganization transactions are not to be con-
sidered within the scope of the registration prospectus and remedial
provisions of the Securities Act simply because the act is not designed
to cope with the problems presented. If, for example, the parties to
a typical merger should be subject to section 5 of the Securities Act,
the constitutent corporation, which is the recipient of the stock of
the surviving corporation, would, upon distribution to its share-
holders, presumably be deemed an underwriter of the issued stock
with an underwriter's liability; the same consequence would possibly
attend the solicitation of shareholder approval of the transaction."
Furthermore, because one or more of the constituent corporations
in a merger or consolidation often cease to exist upon consummation
" In regard to the logical contradiction in not applying the "no sale" rule in all
instances where the word "sale" appears in the statute, see Note, The SEC's No-Sale Rulo
and Exchanges of Securities Pursuant to Voluntary Reorganization, 67 Harv. L. Rev. 1237
(1954), which relies for explanation upon language in the Securities Act (Statutory defi-
nitions shall be used "unless the context otherwise requires."). Securities Act § 2. See I
Loss, op. cit. supra note 24, at 533; Cohen, Rule 133 of the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission, 14 Record of N.Y.C.B.A. 162, 175 (1959).
3 See text accompanying notes 115, 138 infra.32 SEC Rule 133, 17 C.F.R. § 230.133 (Supp. 1962), by its terms applies only for
purposes of § 5 of the Securities Act.
13 The reasoning process utilized in formulating this conclusion is basically that (1) by
definition, the consumation of mergers and certain other reorganizations does not involve
a "sale" of securities, however (2) such transactions may involve a "purchase" for pur-
poses of determining whether the recipient is an underwriter and thus required to register
the securities. Proposed SEC Rule 133--Comments of Committee on Federal Regulation of
Securities, 14 Bus. Law. 423, 425 (1959) citing SEC Securities Act Release No. 3965,
Sept. 15, 1958; Cohen, supra note 30, at 176; 1 Loss, Securities Regulation 533 (2d ed.
1961).
3 See notes 30, 33 supra.
3' See SEC Proposed Revision of Rule 133, SEC Securities Act Release No. 3698, Oct. 2,
1956, stating that "An 'offer', 'offer to sell' or 'offer for sale' of securities shall be deemed
to be made to the stockholders of a corporation when the vote, consent or authorization
of such stockholders is solicited in favor of a proposal for [a reorganization]. . . . A
'sale' is deemed to occur . . . when the stockholders or their proxies cast the required




of the transaction, the remedial problems attendant to, for example,
a suit for rescission against a non-existent corporation, would indeed
be formidable. Registration under the act as it now stands would over-
burden an already complicated process and would remedy few, if
any, of the problems involved."
B. Rule 133 And Tax Reorganizations
It must be noted that Rule 133 is now specifically limited 7 in ap-
plication to section 5 of the Securities Act. When the rule was
formally promulgated in 1951, the Commission called attention to
this fact and added:
[W]hether or not a sale is involved for any other purpose will depend
upon the statutory context, and the question should in no sense be in-
fluenced by the rule. As a matter of statutory construction the Com-
mission does not deem the "no sale theory" which is described in the
rule as being applicable for purposes of any of the anti-fraud provisions
of the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of
1934.3'
It is clear from the language of the rule that it applies only if a
vote of shareholders is necessary to effect the reorganization. There-
fore, if a transaction can be consummated without shareholder ap-
proval, even the formality of an unnecessary vote will not serve to
bring it within the scope of the rule. This language is especially
pertinent to type C and D transactions, because although the other
types of corporate readjustments ordinarily require shareholder ap-
proval, a sale-of-assets maneuver may not.
By its terms, Rule 133 excludes the following transactions from
the term "sale" as defined by the Securities Act:
(1) statutory mergers or consolidations;
3 See Purcell, A Consideration of the No-Sale Theory Under the Securities Act of 1933,
24 Brooklyn L. Rev. 254, 282-83 (1958); Throop, In Defense of Rule 133, A Case for
Administrative Self-Restraint, 13 Bus. Law. 389, 395-99 (1958); SEC, Report on the
Study and Investigation of the Work, Activities, Personnel, and Functions of Protective and
Reorganization Committees pt. VII, at 249 n.172 (1938).
"7 This limitation is no doubt due in part to a misconception that accompanied the
rule for quite some time. This was the so-called "free stock" concept in which it was
contended that stock emerging from a Rule 133 transaction had been "freed" from
registration requirements. The theory was that a recipient could resell his securities without
registering them because there had been no "sale" and therefore no "purchase," and hence
no underwriting as defined by the act. Thus, the theory went, the security was exempted
by section 4(1). Were it valid, the effect of this would be to permit public distribution of
Rule 133 stock with impunity. Fortunately, the belief was dispelled by the Commission,
and it was made clear that registration would be required for any subsequent offers or
sales with the exception of limited "trading transactions" not involving a distribution.
This view was subsequently codified in paragraph (b) of Rule 133. See Orrick, Registration
Problems Under the Federal Securities Act-Resales Following Rule 133 and Exchange
Transactions, 10 Hastings L.J. 1 (1958).
" SEC Securities Act Release No. 3420, Aug. 2, 1951.
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(2) transfers of assets of one corporation to another corporation
in exchange for securities of the latter;
(3) transfers of assets of one corporation to another corporation
in exchange for voting stock of a corporation which is in control"9
of the latter; and
(4) reclassifications of securities.
A comparison of the Rule 133 reorganizations with the several
tax reorganizations reveals that, although similar in nature, sig-
nificant differences do exist. Only the first type of reorganization,
the statutory merger or consolidation, does not vary from its tax
counterpart. 0
A type B4" (stock-for-stock) tax reorganization does not fall
within the literal terms of the rule. For the rule to apply it is neces-
sary that a vote of the stockholders (1) will operate to authorize the
proposed transaction and (2) will bind such stockholders except
to the extent that dissenting stockholders may be entitled to receive
the appraised value of their holdings.2 Since a type B reorganization
entails an exchange of stock on an individual basis and since the act
of the majority will not necessarily bind all of the stockholders, it is
not within the rule or the "no sale" theory.43 This fact does not, of
course, preclude application of other exemptions available under
the act.
In the type C (stock-for-assets) transaction44 the rule will apply
if the transferor transfers any assets in exchange for transferee stock.
The Code, however, requires a transfer of substantially all of the
assets of the transferor in exchange for transferee stock. Also, the
rule permits the transferee to exchange "securities" and, since there
is no express limitation, other properties for the assets received;
whereas, to comply with the Code the transferee must exchange
"solely .. .voting stock"4' for such assets. Thus the Code is more
demanding with respect to the type of securities which may be
" "Control," for purposes of paragraph (a) of Rule 133, means "the ownership of
stock possessing at least 80 per cent of the total combined voting power of all classes of
stock entitled to vote and at least 80 per cent of the total number of shares of all other
classes of stock of the corporation." Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 368 (c).
4Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 368(a) (1) (A). For a discussion of the various factors,
tax and non-tax, pertinent to tax reorganizations, see Darrell, The Use of Reorganization
Techniques in Corporate Acquisitions, 70 Harv. L. Rev. 1183 (1957).
4 1 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 368(a) (1) (B).
4 SEC Rule 133(a), 17 C.F.R. § 230.133(a) (Supp. 1962).
43 See 1 Loss, op. cit. supra note 24, at 528 n.229; Purcell, A Consideration Of The No-
Sale Theory Under the Securities Act of 1933, 24 Brooklyn L. Rev. 254 (1957).
44Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 368(a) (1) (C).
41 nt. Rev. Code of 1954, § 368(a) (1) (C). In the type C transaction, in determining
whether the exchange is solely for stock, the assumption by the acquiring corporation of a




exchanged for the assets and to the type of property which may be
exchanged in addition to such securities. Paradoxically, the rule and
the Code are equally stringent in their requirements when the trans-
fer of assets is in exchange for stock of a corporation which controls
the transferee-both require an exchange of voting stock.
The type D"8 or devisive reorganization is initiated when X, parent
corporation, transfers part of its assets to subsidiary Y, (or in a
"split-up" all of its assets to subsidiaries Y and Z) in exchange for an
amount of stock which will suffice to give the transferor-parent con-
trol of the transferee-subsidiary immediately after the transfer; ob-
viously, this transaction entails an exchange of voting stock. If the
transaction were complete at this point it would undoubtedly qualify
under the rule as a "transfer of assets" which would entail merely
an exchange of securities.
If considered merely a "transfer of assets" under the rule, the type
D reorganization would, of course (assuming a proper plan and
shareholder vote), be excluded from the registration requirements
of the Securities Act. The problem is complicated, however, by para-
graph (c) of Rule 133"7 which deems certain transactions occurring
subsequent to the reorganization exchange to be a distribution sub-
ject to the registration and prospectus requirements of section 5.
Specifically, paragraph (c) states that a corporate party to a Rule
133 transaction (or a person in a control relationship with the cor-
poration) acquiring securities of an issuer in connection with such a
transaction with a view to distribution of the securities, is deemed an
underwriter and must register the distributed securities unless ex-
empted by some other section of the act."' Since a "devisive reorgani-
zation" invariably involves a distribution of stock-though not
necessarily in the Rule 133 sense-by the parent corporation to its
shareholders, paragraph (c) and its effect upon the transaction must
be examined with care.
After the initial transaction in which subsidiary stock is exchanged
for parent assets, a "spinoff" will ordinarily involve a distribution by
the parent of the issuing subsidiary's voting stock to the parent stock-
holders without a surrendering by them of any of the parent stock.
This transaction presents no problem for it does not constitute a
"sale" within the meaning of the act, because no value"' is given by
"'Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 368 (a) (1) (D); see Comment, Devisive Reorganizations
Under the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 67 Yale L.J. 38 (1957).
" Paragraph (c) of Rule 133 codified the Commission's existing interpretation of the
Rule. I Loss, ob. cit. supra note 24, at 535-36.
48 SEC Rule 133(c), 17 C.F.R. § 230.133(c) (Supp, 1962).
49 See 1 Loss, ob. cit. supra note 24, at 513.
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the parent shareholders in return for the subsidiary stock; value is,
of course, a necessary constituent of a "sale," ' which in turn is a
necessary concomitant of a distribution.51 Furthermore, if regarded
as a partial liquidation under the local corporation law, the trans-
action is excluded from the section 5 requirements by that provision
in paragraph (c) of the rule which sanctions complete or partial
liquidations.52
After the initial exchange of stock for assets, a "split-off" will
ordinarily involve an exchange of the stock of the issuing subsidiary
which was received by the parent with the parent shareholders in
return for parent stock then held by such shareholders. Should the
surrender of parent stock be considered as the giving of value, then
this is a sale and hence a "distribution" under the Securities Act.
However, it may be contended that the rights of the participating
shareholders have not been sufficiently affected by the transaction in
terms of the security previously held so as to constitute anything
other than a formal alteration of the surrendered security. " If this is
so, then no value is given for the security and no "sale" is effected;
this interpretation precludes a "distribution" and prevents applica-
tion of section 5. It is also possible that a "split-off" can properly be
regarded as a "reclassification" and thus protected by the specific
terms of the rule.
Following the parent-subsidiary transaction a "split-up" will in-
volve an exchange of the subsidiary stock received by the parent with
the parent shareholders in return for parent stock. The exchange is
followed by a complete liquidation of the parent and therefore falls
within that part of paragraph (c) of the rule which shields com-
plete liquidations." Moreover, for Rule 133 purposes, "split-ups" are
generally accorded the status of "reclassifications" 5 and hence do not
require registration.
The types E and F reorganizations are also probably within the
scope of the term "reclassification" and thus exempt from registra-
tion. In these or in any other reorganizations, however, if the share-
holders have an election to surrender all or part of their shares for
" Securities Act § 2(3): The term "'sale' or 'sell' shall include every contract of sale
or disposition of a security . . . for value." (Emphasis added.)
" The term "distribution" is not defined in the act. It is generally considered to be
essentially equivalent to a "public offering" which entails an offer or sale of securities.
See Orrick, Registration Problems Under the Federal Securities Act-Resales Following
Rule 133 And Exchange Transactions, 10 Hastings L.J. 1, 5 (1958).
" But see Bromberg, Corporate Liquidation and Securities Law-Problems in the Dis-
tribution of Portfolio Securities, 3 Boston Col. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 1, 11 (1961).
53 Cf. 1 Loss, op. cit. supra note 24, at 514.
54 See Bromberg, supra note 52, at 11.
55 1 Loss, op. cit. supra note 24, at 521.
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securities being distributed pursuant to the reorganization plan, then
Rule 133 will be inapplicable because the vote of the majority is not
binding upon all stockholders.
Although not peculiar to tax reorganizations, the 1959 amend-
ments to the rule deserve mention. As indicated, the purposes of the
amendments were to specify the circumstances under which securities
distributed by the persons receiving them in connection with re-
organization transactions would have to be registered under the
Securities Act.55
Paragraph (b) 57 deems an underwriter to be any person who pur-
chases an issuer's securities from security holders of a constituent
corporation with a view to distribution or who offers or sells securi-
ties for these security holders in connection with a distribution pur-
suant to a contract with an issuer, an affiliate, or a person acting as an
underwriter in a Rule 133 transaction. The paragraph appears to
hold no particular pitfalls for tax reorganizations.
However, there is some ambiguity. Literally read, the amendment
seems to limit the rule to a distribution arising out of a contract with
an issuer, a person in a control relationship with an issuer, or with
a person who is acting as an underwriter of the securities. Therefore,
a person who agrees with the constituent shareholders to effect a
distribution of the securities received is not covered by the terms of
the amendment unless such person is considered an underwriter be-
cause he is acting pursuant to a contract with an underwriter (the
non-controlling stockholder) under the Schering-White rationale."
Furthermore, since the term "issuer" was specifically excluded
"0 SEC Securities Act Release No. 4077, May 4, 1959. The amendment codified previous
views held by the Commission. See SEC v. Micro-Moisture Controls, Inc., 148 F. Supp. 558
(S.D.N.Y. 1957) (preliminary injunction), 167 F. Supp. 716 (S.D.N.Y. 1958) (final
injunction), aff'd sub nom. SEC v. Culpepper, 270 F.2d 241 (2d Cir. 1959) (secondary
distribution of unregistered stock by persons in control of issuer unlawful even though
distributed stock obtained in a Rule 133 transaction); Great Sweet Grass Oils, Ltd.,
37 S.E.C. 683 (1957), aff'd without opinion, 256 F.2d 893 (D.C. Cir. 1958) (Rule 133
not to be relied upon where there is a pre-existing plan to use stockholders as a conduit
for distribution); Interpretation and Application of Rule 133, SEC Securities Act Release
No. 3846, Oct. 10, 1957 (distribution subsequent to a Rule 133 transaction by stock-
holder who takes with a view to distribution will be deemed an underwriting); 71 Harv.
L. Rev. 1570 (1958).
'7Rule 133(b), 17 C.F.R. § 230.133(b) (Supp. 1962). Note, however, that this
paragraph provides for arrangements whereby security holders may realize cash for fractional
interests or may round out their holdings by the purchase of fractional shares.
SSEC Securities Act Release No. 3846, Oct. 10, 1957: "Rule 133 would provide no
exemption from the registration and prospectus provisions of Section 5 of the Act with
respect to any subsequent public distribution of the shares received by any security holder
. . . who might be deemed a statutory underwriter." The Commission determined that the
party referred to would be a statutory underwriter if it should acquire shares of the
issuing corporation in the merger with a view to distribution. Although not identified in
the release, the participating companies were Schering Corporation and White Laboratories,
Inc. Noted, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 1570 (1958). See discussion, Cohen, supra note 30, at 166.
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from the definition of "constituent corporation," a person who pur-
chases securities from the issuer's shareholders or sells for them the
new securities received in connection with, for example, a type E
or F exchange, does not appear to be within the terms of paragraph
(b). Consequently, a possible loophole exists in this instance because
no registration will be required if the transaction can qualify as a
Rule 133 "reclassification." Presumably, however, this seller may be
considered one who "sells for an issuer" and thus an underwriter
within the meaning of section 2 (11) .5
Paragraph (c)" imposes the status of an "underwriter" upon any
constituent corporation or a person in a control relationship with
such a corporation who acquires"1 securities in a Rule 133 transaction
with a view to their distribution. Somewhat perplexing is the fact
that a resale of a number of shares of the issuing successor corpora-
tion by one in control of a constituent corporation may be deemed
a "distribution," while a resale of an even larger number of shares
by a non-controlling shareholder of the constituent may not. Pre-
sumably section 2 (11) is applicable under the Schering-White ra-
tionale, 1 and anyone who acquires shares of an issuer in a Rule 133
transaction with a view to distribution will be a statutory under-
writer subject to the registration requirement of the Securities Act.6
For purposes of paragraph (c) there is no specific definition of
Itcontrol." Prior to enactment of the amendment it was suggested
that the Commission adopt the test of "voting control" for use under
the rule." None was adopted, however, and the criterion is probably
the nebulous "working control" test which is used in determining
the applicability of section 2 (11)."
For the sake of predictability a mechanical rule of thumb would
be appropriate in this situation. It has been suggested that "control"
for purposes of paragraph (c) should mean the ownership of not
less than the percentage of outstanding shares necessary to effectuate
the particular transaction in question. " This may be too high, and
perhaps an arbitrary figure of thirty per cent or even as low as ten
per cent would be more appropriate. The suggesion is basically sound,
S See I Loss, Securities Regulation 535 n.253 (2d ed. 1961).
0OSEC Rule 133(c), 17 C.F.R. § 230.133(c) (Supp. 1961).
" The word "acquires" was used instead of "purchases" to soften the anomaly of a
purchase without a sale. 1 Loss, op. cit. supra note 59, at 535.
62 See note 58 supra.
63 See Operator Consol. Mines Co., SEC Exchange Act Release No. 6129 (Dec. 9, 1959).
"Proposed SEC Rule 133--Comments of Committee On Federal Regulation of Securities,
14 Bus. Law. 423 (1959).
0'See SEC Rule 405, 17 CF.R. § 230.405 (Supp. 1961); 15 Bus. Law. 119, 124 (1959);
see also 1 Loss, Securities Regulation 557 (2d ed. 1961).
66 See 14 Bus. Law. 423, 430 (1959).
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however, because from a practical standpoint it would at least re-
lieve the issuing successor from uncertainty in having to determine
what persons are underwriters and what securities must be registered.
In an area which abounds in complexities, this is a significant factor.
Paragraphs (d) and (e) of the amended rule permit sales without
registration by persons coming within the provisions of paragraph
(c) if they involve relatively small amounts made in brokers trans-
actions."
As is the case with many administrated acts, a significant amount
of gloss has been added to the literal Rule 133. Included are the
c"negotiated transaction,"" "unanimous consent transaction,"6 and
"conduit transaction""0 doctrines which, like the judicial gloss placed
upon the Internal Revenue Code, are primarily aimed at preventing
evasion of registration requirements by requiring a substantial rather
than a literal compliance with the rule.
C. Section 3 (a) (9) And Tax Reorganizations
Section 3 (a) (9) of the Securities Act exempts "any security ex-
changed by the issuer with its existing security holders exclusively
where no commission or other remuneration is paid or given directly
or indirectly for soliciting such exchange." 7' Although originally
promulgated under the section of the act which pertains to exempted
securities, the Commission subsequently has taken the position that
section 3 (a) (9) is merely a transaction exemption. Hence the securi-
ties exchanged are never permanently exempted from registration
under this section."
Because the terms of the exemption preclude its application in any
reorganization which involves more than one corporation, it is ob-
viously only pertinent to the types E and F reorganizations. To be
exempt, one of these reorganizations must involve (1) an exchange
of an issuer's securities for other securities of the issuer, (2) an ex-
6 7 SEC Rule 133(d)(e), 17 C.F.R. § 230.133(d)(e) (Supp. 1962). For a detailed
discussion of the problems presented by the amendments to Rule 133 see Throop, Recent
Developments With Respect to Rule 133, 15 Bus. Law. 119 (1959).
"8 Great Sweet Grass Oils, Ltd. and Kroy Oils, Ltd., SEC Exchange Act Release No. 5483
(April 8, 1957) (Rule 133 inapplicable where vote of stockholders mere formality); see
Purcell, supra note 18, at 275.
69 Purcell, supra note 18, at 277 (The no-sale rule does not apply where unanimous
vote of stockholders is required.).
10 Great Sweet Grass Oils, Ltd. and Kroy Oils, Ltd., SEC Exchange Act Release No. 5483
(April 8, 1957) (where pre-existing plan to use stockholders merely as conduit, Rule 133
inapplicable).
" Securities Act § 3 (a) (9).
" SEC Securities Act Release No. 646 (class c), Feb. 3, 1936; Thompson Ross Sec.
Co., 6 S.E.C. 1111 (1940).
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change with existing security holders only, (3) an exchange solely
of securities, and (4) no paid solicitation.73
Since the corporation issuing the new security in exchange for
the old one is required to be the same corporation that originally
issued the old security, any change in the corporate make-up (even
in name) which occurs subsequent to the initial issuance and prior
to the exchange may prevent utilization of this section. For this
reason the type F reorganization which involves a "mere change in
identity, form or place of organization, ... " may be precluded from
receiving the benefit of this exemption.
Moreover, if according to applicable state law the successor cor-
poration in a type A merger is considered to be a new entity, the
3 (a) (9) exemption is not available in an exchange for securities
issued by that corporation prior to the merger."4 Likewise, an ex-
change by a consolidated corporation for securities issued before a
type A consolidation will not be exempt under this section.
The exemption specifies that the issued security must be "ex-
changed" by the issuer with its existing security holders. Hence, a
question arises concerning the definition of an "exchange." The In-
come Tax Regulations 5 state that a type E recapitalization takes place
when a corporation with bonds outstanding discharges them by issu-
ing stock instead of cash to the bondholders. Presumably, the corpora-
tion will recall the discharged bonds and this will qualify as an "ex-
change" and thus the problem will be avoided. But, if it does not
recall the bonds, it is doubtful if an "exchange" can be found. A
similiar result will likely attend a recapitalization in which a cor-
poration issues securities in discharge of an interest obligation which
is not evidenced by a writing. If the obligation is not represented by
some written "evidence of indebtedness,"7 then it can hardly be
said that an "exchange" takes place when the security holder trans-
fers nothing upon receipt of the new securities.
The problem is not entirely academic, for if the "exchange" is
absent and the exemption cannot be utilized, any waiver of pay-
ments" by the shareholders will certainly constitute value" which in
'3 For a detailed discussion of this exemption see 1 Loss, Securities Regulation 573-84
(2d ed. 1961).
"I Loss, Securities Regulation 361 (Supp. 1955).
T"Treas. Reg. § 1.368-2(e) (1955).
76 Section 2(1) of the Securities Act defines a security as an "evidence of indebtedness."
If the accrued interest is not represented by coupons or a writing, then unless the holder
exchanges the bond with the issuer, it can hardly be said that an exchange takes place
when the security holder transfers nothing.
7 A 3(a)(9) exchange is not deprived of its "exclusiveness" solely because the share-
holder is required to accompany the exchange by a cash payment (or its equivalent?), as
is necessary to effect an equitable adjustment in respect of dividends or interest paid or
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turn will engender a "sale" and will thus require registration of the
issued securities. Securities issued in exchange for the waiver of
accrued dividends on preferred stock or cash dividends declared on
preferred or common stock present variations of the same problem."'
Compliance with the requirements that a transaction involve an
exchange solely with existing security holders and that it involve an
exchange of securities only is primarily a matter of mechanics and
should cause no particular reorganization problems.
The fourth requirement-that the exchange involve no paid solici-
tation-is likewise not troublesome unless the recapitalization in-
volves the use of proxy solicitors, and in that case the exemption will
probably s" be unavailable.
Because the recapitalization transaction affords an available vehicle
for avoidance of both securities"' and tax laws,82 an interesting parallel
has evolved between the administrative and judicial gloss which has
been placed upon the transaction. That is, to qualify for purposes of
section 3 (a) (9), these transactions must be "bonafide, in the sense
that they are not effected merely as a step in a plan to evade the
registration requirements of the Act";83 for purposes of the income
tax provisions the recapitalization must be not merely "a vehicle,
however elaborate or elegant, for conveying earnings from accumula-
tions to the stockholders."84
II. THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934
A. Proxy Regulation And Tax Reorganizations
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the rules and regulations
promulgated by the Securities and Exchange Commission apply to
all corporations whose securities are listed on a national securities
exchange; and the Commission's power to regulate proxy solicita-
tion" extends to all securities so listed. It does not extend, however,
payable on the securities involved in the exchange as between such security holder and
other security holders of the same class accepting the offer of exchange. SEC Rule 149,
17 C.F.R. S 230.149 (Supp. 1961).
8 1 Loss, Securities Regulation 513-14 (2d ed. 1961).
79 Id. at 576.
80 See Purcell, supra note 36, at 284, where the author suggests that the employment
of proxy solicitors to secure votes for the approval of a reclassification of securities which
will bind both assenting and non-assenting shareholders does not prohibit reliance on
section 3 (a) (9).
81 SEC Securities Act Release No. 646 (class c), Feb. 3, 1936.
'2 See Michaelson, "Business Purpose" and Tax-Free Reorganization, 61 Yale L.J. 14
(1962).
"'2SEC Securities Act Release No. 646 (class c), Feb. 3, 1936.
84Bazley v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 737 (1947); Michaelson, supra note 82, at 26-44.
8 Exchange Act § 14. The term "proxy solicitation" embraces "any writings which
are part of a continuous plan ending in solicitation and which prepare the way for its
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to solicitations with respect to unlisted securities of companies having
securities that are listed."0 It has been said that the Commission de-
signed the rules and regulations governing proxies "so as to make
the proxy device the closest practicable substitute for attendance of
the meeting .'' . Whether this purpose has been achieved is subject to
controversy."8
The problems concerning proxy solicitations which attend reor-
ganizations arise primarily with respect to the protection to be
afforded shareholders who participate in these readjustments. Ade-
quate disclosure of the pertinent details is ordinarily not required un-
less one of the participating corporations utilizes listed securities.
Consequently, many reorganizations are consummated without prop-
er disclosure to the shareholders involved."9
With the exception of the type B stock-for-stock transaction,
virtually all of the tax reorganizations involve approval by a vote of
the shareholders. Specifically, the types A, D, E, and F transactions
require a vote of shareholders for all participating corporations, while
the type C reorganization normally requires only a vote of the trans-
feror or constituent corporation's shareholders."' Ordinarily, these
shareholders vote by proxies which are solicited by the corporate
management.
According to the rules of the Commission no proxy solicitation
may be conducted unless the person solicited is furnished with a
proxy statement."2 This statement, sometimes compared to the Securi-
ties Act prospectus,93 must contain a full disclosure of corporate
affairs as prescribed by twenty-one "items" contained in schedule
14A" of the Exchange Act. The schedule 14A requirements, stated
success." SEC v. Okin, 132 F.2d 784, 786 (2d Cir. 1943) (Hand, J.), 56 Harv. L. Rev.
829 (1943). This does not mean, however, that all communications from management to
stockholders are inherently a part of a continuous plan of proxy solicitation, or that no
communication may be made by management to stockholders except with the Commission's
approval. Dyer v. SEC, 287 F.2d 773 (8th Cir. 1961).
002 Loss, Securities Regulation 867 (2d ed. 1961).
I7 1d. at 869.
58 See Latty, Exploration of Legislative Remedy for Prejudicial Changes In Senior Shares,
19 U. Chi. L. Rev. 759 (1952).
"0See, e.g., Sawyer v. Pioneer Mill Co., 190 F. Supp. 21 (D. Hawaii 1960); 2 Loss,
op. cit. supra note 86, at 867.
" Henn, Corporations §§ 340-51 (1961); Darrell, supra note 40; Latty, supra note 88.
All transactions accomplished under Rule 133 of the Securities Act must be effected
pursuant to a vote of the stockholders. SEC Rule 133, 17 C.F.R. § 230.133 (Supp. 1962).
9 Darrell, supra note 40, at 1193.
9 SEC Rule 14a-3, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-3 (Supp. 1962).
o 2 Loss, op. cit. supra note 86, at 877.
" SEC Schedule 14A, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a (Supp. 1962). The information which must
be included in the proxy statement generally pertains to solicitations concerning the ordinary
corporate functions which require shareholder vote and is not peculiar to the reorganization
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very broadly and cumulatively, require: (1) a brief description of
the transaction or its material features; (2) a disclosure of the reasons
for the proposed transaction and its effect upon existing shareholders;
(3) a statement of existing arrearages or defaults and how the pro-
posed transaction will affect them; (4) a disclosure of any material
differences between old and new securities in an exchange or modi-
fication transaction; (5) a statement of general information regard-
ing the party to the transaction; (6) a disclosure of pertinent in-
formation regarding property to be transferred including facts bear-
ing upon the consideration to be given; and (7) such information as
may be appropriate to evaluate the nature and effect of the proposed
transaction.
Much of the sparse amount of litigation pertaining to proxy solici-
tation in reorganizations" has concerned the sufficiency of the infor-
mation given in the proxy statement; therefore, few general prin-
ciples can be derived from the cases. Due perhaps to the complexity
of reorganization transactions, the courts have not been overly de-
manding in determining whether a particular proxy statement omits
a material fact. Thus, a failure to state possible alternatives to a plan
of recapitalization does not necessarily render a proxy statement false
and misleading," nor does the failure to state that management's
proposed reorganization plan is conceived and planned to perpetuate
transactions. Certain items, however, deal directly with these reorganizations and conse-
quently require scrutiny.
Item 2 of Schedule 14A requires that the appraisal rights of dissenters and any statutory
procedure to be followed to perfect these rights be briefly stated. The type A reorganization
invariably involves specific statutory rights of dissenters as often does the type C reorganiza-
tion. See Ballantine, Corporations 700 (rev. ed. 1946). The types D, E, and F transactions
may involve these rights depending upon the law of the particular jurisdiction. In any of
these transactions, whether or not required, it may be to the best interest of all concerned
to grant certain privileges to a dissident minority. See Johnson, Reorganizations-Minority
Stockholders Including Dissenters, N.Y.U. 18th Inst. on Fed. Tax. 821 (1960).
Item 4 is important because it calls for brief description of the holdings of officers,
directors, and their associates who are connected with any reorganization transaction. See
SEC Exchange Act Release No. 1350, Aug. 13, 1957.
Item 12 describes information to be furnished in any proxy statement which concerns
authorization or issuance of securities other than for exchange for the issuer's outstanding
securities. Item 13, peculiar to types E and F transactions, describes information to be
supplied in regard to a proposed modification of the issuer's securities or to a contemplated
exchange of securities for others outstanding.
Items 14 and 16 refer to the information to be contained in statements regarding
mergers, consolidations, acquisitions, and similar transactions and are, of course, especially
pertinent to the types A, B, C, and D reorganizations. Item 15 specifies financial statements
which are to accompany solicitations regarding these transactions.
95 SEC Rule 14A-9, 17 C.F.R. 240.14a-9 (Supp. 1962), makes unlawful any solicitation
subject to the Commission's proxy rules which contains any statement which is false or
misleading with respect to any material fact, or which omits to state any material fact
necessary in order to make that statement not false or misleading.
"Doyle v. Milton, 73 F. Supp. 281 (D.C.N.Y. 1947), noted, 46 Mich. L. Rev. 1111
(1948). But cf. Eureka Co., SEC Exchange Act Release No. 5729 (July 7, 1958).
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control of the corporation in the present group.97 Furthermore, a
statement is not false and misleading simply because it names only
the directors who submitted written objections to a proposed merger
and fails to mention several who orally opposed the transaction."s
In the language of one court, neither the Exchange Act nor the
Commission's rules "require that corporate reorganizations and
mergers be explained in language comprehensible to school child-
ren.""
B. Rule lOb-5 And Tax Reorganizations
Rule lob-5,"' promulgated pursuant to section 10(b)"' of the
Exchange Act, proscribes the use of the mails, interstate commerce, or
a facility of a national securities exchange to promote fraudulent or
misleading practices in connection with the purchase or sale of
securities. Specifically, it prohibits a misstatement or omission of
material facts.
Although section 10 (b) makes no express provision for a private
right of action, courts, beginning with the Kardon case in 1946, have
consistently implied one.' Furthermore, in sustaining these actions
they have imposed standards of disclosure higher than those of the
common law.'
97 Doyle v. Milton, supra note 96.
98 American Hardware Corp. v. Savage Arms Corp., 136 A.2d 690 (Del. Ch. 1957).
Item 3 of Schedule 14A requires that the proxy statement contain "the name of any
director of the issuer who has informed the management in writing that he intends to
oppose any action intended to be taken by the management .. "
99Shvets v. Industrial Rayon Corp., CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 5 90, at 958 (S.D.N.Y.
1960). The plaintiff complained that the proxy statement failed to disclose (1) the book
value of shares which the stockholders were to receive if the merger were consummated,
(2) legal complications that would result in connection with one of the party's mortgage
notes, (3) that the earnings of one of the companies to be merged was overstated, (4) the
relationship between certain directors in two interested corporations, and (5) that certain
mortgage agreements of a corporation to be merged would be exposed to immediate fore-
closure liability. The court gave weight to the fact that the Commission had previously
approved the proxy statement.
"0 SEC Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.I0b-5 (2d ed. 1949).
'o' Exchange Act § lob.
"2 Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946) (motion to dis-
miss complaint), 73 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa. 1947) (on the merits), 83 F. Supp. 613 (E.D.
Pa. 1947) (request for additional findings), 40 Mich. L. Rev. 680 (1946). The Kardon
case was the first to hold that Rule lob-5 supplied a civil remedy to an injured seller.
This finding was based upon the premise that violation of a statute enacted to protect a
particular class of individuals constitutes a tort. See White, infra note 104. The Commission
has indicated that a disclosure will be insufficient if it is such that the "stockholders could
not have acted intelligently with reference to their sale of stock." Ward LaFrance Truck
Corp., 13 S.E.C. 373, 379 (1943).
10 Compare Geller v. Transamerican Corp., 53 F. Supp. 625 (D. Del. 1943) (common
law action dismissed), with Speed v. Transamerican Corp., 71 F. Supp. 457 (D. Del. 1947)
(Rule 1ob-5 action arising out of same transaction sustained). See Texas Continental Life
Ins. Co. v. Bankers Bond Co., 187 F. Supp. 14, 22-25 (W.D. Ky. 1960) (plaintiff purchaser's
motion for directed verdict on common law overruled by district court; motion for a directed
verdict on Rule lob-5 granted).
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Although applicable to any person who engages in the prohibited
practices, the rule has been primarily utilized in the area of pur-
chases of securities by corporate insiders."' It closes a gap in the
common law.. by imposing an affirmative obligation upon an in-
sider-purchaser to disclose matters obtained by virtue of his position
"which would materially affect the judgment of the other party to
the transaction.""'06
It is probably safe to say that any person who is in a position to
garner pertinent information of a confidential nature is subject to the
rule. Thus, controlling shareholders and their immediate families,
officers, directors, employees, business associates, and even persons
who receive gratuitous inside information with knowledge of its
nature are all potentially within its scope."'
Although it is not certain, the obligation to disclose which is placed
upon the insider-purchaser is probably placed upon the insider-seller
also."'
It is clear that an insider-purchaser with knowledge of a pending
reorganization is potentially liable to his seller for failure to disclose
this information."' In a similar situation it is also clear that a pur-
chase by the issuer of its own securities will subject it to liability."'
Since the higher obligation under this rule is to the selling share-
holder, there is little validity in the contention that persons who
purchase on behalf of the issuer are obligated to do so as cheaply as
possible without resorting to actual misrepresentation."'
The rule is of special value in exchanges in which a shareholder is
given a choice between accepting or rejecting a new security or be-
tween taking that security or obtaining appraisal rights."' In these
'o1 See White, Swindlers and the Securities Acts, 45 A.B.A.J. 129, 131 (1959).
"' Advantages afforded an injured purchaser or seller under this rule are: (1) a plain-
tiff need only show damage and a misstatement or omission of a material fact; he need not
show damages if rescission is sought; he need not show a "privity" relationship; (2) a de-
fendant is provided no affirmative defense; (3) there exists a more favorable statute of
limitations; (4) nationwide service is available; and (5) federal rules of discovery are
available.
'0' Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798, 800 (E.D. Pa. 1947).
"'See 3 Loss, Securities Regulation 1450 (2d ed. 1961); Comment, The Prospects for
Rule X-10b-5: An Emerging Remedy for Defrauded Investors, 59 Yale L.J. 1120, 1144
(1950).
'See 3 Loss, Securities Regulation 1454-55 (2d ed. 1961).
10Cf. Ward LaFrance Truck Corp., 13 S.E.C. 373 (1943) (pending sale of interest and
merger); Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa. 1947) (pending sale
of assets).
"'Speed v. Transamerican Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808 (D. Del. 1951); See Note, Purchases
by a Corporation of Its Own Preferred Shares With Dividends in Arrears, 14 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 66 (1946).
111 3 Loss, op. cit. supra note 107, at 1454. In regard to the problem of an insider's
obligation to the corporation not to disclose secret processes and the like, see Comment,
supra note 107, at 1147.
"' Thus, besides the type A, B, and C transactions, it is also pertinent to the D and E
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transactions, the security holder must make a decision upon the facts
as presented; and provided the requisite purchase or sale exists, he
should be entitled to full disclosure of facts material to the trans-
action, assuming that use is made of the mails or an instrumentality
of interstate commerce."
Remedies for several abuses attendant to reorganizations appear
to be emerging from this rule. Basing its holding upon the act's
broad definition of its terms,14 one court has recently found that
for lob-5 purposes a "purchase and sale" may be involved in a
corporate merger.11' When extended, this principle may apply to all
tax reorganizations and thus require disclosure similar to that of a
prospectus, for these transactions, with exception,"6 involve a pur-
chase and sale of securities for both Securities Act".' and Exchange
Act"' purposes. Because the rule is activated by a "purchase or sale,"
it logically applies to these transactions and should thus afford share-
holder-participants a remedy for inadequate disclosure.'' This is of
significant import with regard to securities which are not listed and
therefore not subject to the disclosure requirements of the Commis-
sion's proxy regulations."'
The Ninth Circuit has found fraud existing under 10b-5 with
respect to the value of the consideration given for a security, ' as
reorganizations which may involve a voluntary exchange of shares by the corporation and
its shareholders.
"'See Pratt v. Robinson, 203 F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1953), holding that the fraudulent
act need not be effected by the use of the mails or an instrumentality of interstate com-
merce and that use of the mails to contact a third party in connection with the transaction
was sufficient to invoke the rule.
114 Exchange Act § 3 (a) (13): "The terms 'buy' and 'purchase' each include any con-
tract to buy, purchase, or otherwise acquire." "The terms 'sale' and 'sell' each include any
contract to sell or otherwise dispose of." Exchange Act § 3 (a) (14).
.' See H. L. Green Co. v. Childree, 185 F. Supp. 95 (S.D.N.Y. 1960). Contra, Sawyer
v. Pioneer Mill Co., 190 F. Supp. 21 (D. Hawaii 1960). The SEC filed an amicus brief in
the court of appeals urging that exchanges of securities to effect a corporate merger con-
stitute purchases and sales of securities within the meaning of § lob and Rule lob-5.
... The type D, E, and F transactions may not always involve a purchase and sale of
securities. See note 49 supra and accompanying text.
1.7 Rule 133 of the Securities Act excludes reorganization transactions from the term
sale only for the purposes of registration and prospectus requirements of that act. See the
definition of "sale" under the Securities Act in note 13 supra. See also note 38 supra and
accompanying text.
"' The definition of purchase and sale in the Exchange Act is much broader than that
of the same terms in the Securities Act. Compare Securities Act § 2 (3), with Exchange Act55 3(a)(13), -(14).
"'. See Comment, supra note 107, at 1150.
"o SEC Securities Act Release No. 3698, Oct. 2, 1956:
Unless the . . . [securities involved in a tax reorganization] . . . are listed on
a national securities exchange, in which event a proxy statement under the
Commission's proxy rules must be furnished if proxies are solicited, these
transactions may occur without the disclosure of adequate information to
security holders.
"' Errion v. Connell, 236 F.2d 447 (9th Cir. 1956); Note, 9 Stan. L. Rev. 589 (1957).
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opposed to fraud with respect to the value of the security itself.
When extended, this principle may provide a means of relief for cor-
porate recipients of overvalued assets in, for example, a type A, C, or
D reorganization. 2 ' The holding, though questioned,'23 seems sound
in that fraudulent consideration appears to be well within the rule's
proscription of fraud "in connection with" the purchase or sale of
a security.
One other aspect of the rule deserves brief mention. Two recent
cases have considered the applicability of lob-5 to a situation in
which a large stockholder sold a controlling interest for a price con-
siderably above that of the existing market. Minority shareholders,
who were not offered the same price for their stock, alleged fraud
upon the stockholders in connection -with a purchase or sale of
securities. In one case, a district court denied a motion to dismiss
without opinion." ' In the other, a court of appeals affirmed a dis-
missal for failure to state a cause of action."' If the rationale im-
plicit in the holding of the district court should be adopted, and a
shareholder who is not a purchaser or a seller does possess a cause of
action under similar circumstances, the rule may possibly be utilized
by a dissident minority in any reorganization and thus afford a
remedy which supplements that of the particular state law. This
reasoning would appear to apply also to a type E exchange in which
the exchange offer is made only to a select group of shareholders.
Employment of the rule in these situations is unlikely, however, for
the court of appeals seems to have stated the prevailing view that
"the Rule ...is aimed only at 'a fraud perpetrated upon the pur-
chaser or seller' of securities and .. .[has] no relation to breaches of
fiduciary duty by corporate insiders resulting in fraud upon those
who were not purchasers or sellers."'' 1
C. Section 16 And Tax Reorganizations
Section 16(a) of the Exchange Act. 7 requires that every officer
or director of a corporation which has an equity security.. registered
122 nt. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 368(a) (1) (A), -(B), -(C); cf. Hooper v. Mountain
States Sec. Corp., 282 F.2d 195 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 814 (1960) (Corporation
has a private right of action where issued stock in exchange for spurious assets.); noted, 18
Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 243 (1961).
123 See Note, 9 Stan. L. Rev. 586 (1957).
124 McManus v. Jessup & Moore Paper Co., 5 S.E.C. 810 (E.D. Pa. 1948).
125Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1952) (A. Hand, J.), 100
U. Pa. L. Rev. 1251 (1952).
12 Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., supra note 125, at 463; see 3 Loss, op. cit. supra
note 107, at 1468-69.
1" Exchange Act § 16.
12 Exchange Act § 3 (a) (11) defines the term "equity security" to mean
any stock or similar security; or any security convertible, with or without
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on a national exchange, as well as every beneficial owner of more
than ten per cent of any class of a registered equity security, file
with the Commission and the exchange an initial report of the hold-
ings of all such equity securities of that issuer. Also, monthly reports
must be filed when a change in holdings occurs.
Because the term "corporation" is included within the act's defini-
tion of the word "person," a corporation must comply with these
requirements if in a reorganization it acquires more than ten per
cent of another corporation's registered equity securities. Failure to
do so may result in criminal prosecution or a mandatory injunction.1 9
Section 16(b)"'3 permits recovery by an issuer, or by a security
holder if the issuer refuses to take requested action, of profits realized
by "insiders" (directors, officers and principal stockholders) .. from
any "purchase and sale" or any "sale and purchase" of an equity
security (other than an exempted security) of the issuer within a
period of less than six months. For purposes of this section profits
are determined on the basis of maximum economic gain without re-
gard to basis or realization of profit for tax purposes.' 2 The section
was intended to "protect the 'outside' stockholders against . . . short
swing speculation by insiders with advance information . . .,,,3 and
the courts have consistently given it a liberal construction in order
to accomplish that purpose."'
The section is particularly pertinent to reorganizations because of
the many opportunities for abuse of confidential information. How-
ever, because of the varied and complex nature of a reorganization
transaction, general principles concerning the applicability of 16(b)
are difficult to derive. The dominant question in the decisions appears
to be whether a particular transaction involves the sort of specula-
tion encompassed by section 16 (b)."' Venturing past that point, one
moves into the realm of conjecture.
consideration, into such a security; or carrying any warrant or right to sub-
scribe to or purchase such a security; or any such warrant or right; or any
other security which the Commission shall deem to be of similar nature and
consider necessary or appropriate ...
129 For a discussion of this section see 2 Loss, Securities Regulation 1038-40 (2d ed.
1961).
3 Exchange Act § 16(b).
13' As to the persons encompassed within this term, see Cook & Feldman, Insider Trading
Under the Securities Exchange Act, 66 Harv. L. Rev. 385, at 397-405 (1953).
.. Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 751
(1943).
133 Ibid.
4 But see Blau v. Lehman, 368 U.S. 403 (1962), where the Court refused to permit
recovery under § 16(b) against an investment banking partnership a member of which was
a director of the corporation in whose stock the partnership made a profitable short-swing
transaction.




As is often the case in 16(b) situations, the difficulty arises in
determining whether or not a specific transaction involves the requi-
site "purchase and sale" or "sale and purchase" of an equity security.
Certainly it is possible for there to be a "purchase""13  or a "sale
' 137
in a tax reorganization within the meaning of this section, for in
most instances these transactions involve a voluntary exchange of
securities for assets or for securities of another issuer. Either exchange
should be considered a "purchase" or "sale" just as if the considera-
tion had been cash.
The courts have generally adopted this view in finding a purchase
or sale to exist in transactions similar to tax reorganizations. Thus,
a purchase, to be matched against a subsequent sale, has been found
in a corporate simplification in which the purchased stock was ob-
tained by shareholders of a subsidiary pursuant to a sale of assets by
the subsidiary corporation to the parent. "' In principle, the holding
is equally applicable to types A and C transactions.
In a transaction somewhat analogous to the type B reorganization,
the Second Circuit held the requisite "sale" to exist in an exchange
of stock between a parent corporation and its subsidiary. 3 Very
likely a "purchase" would be found to exist in the same transaction.
As opposed to the problem of finding a purchase or sale in a tax
reorganization, a more difficult one arises in bringing within the terms
of the Exchange Act insiders who speculate, not in securities of the
corporation with which they are connected, but in securities of
another corporation which is a party to the reorganization. When
read literally the section envisions an "insider" as one who maintains
an "inside" position with the corporation whose securities he pur-
chases. If this is so, then it is likely that some insider short-swing
transactions do not come within the proscription of the section. For
example, in a type B reorganization it is doubtful whether the sec-
tion will apply to an officer or director of corporation X who, utiliz-
ing confidential information, purchases securities of participating
corporation Y and profits from a favorable reorganization exchange
which occurs less than six months later.
It is arguable that the purchased securities of corporation Y ought
to be treated like convertible securities of corporation X because they
may be converted into X securities at a later date-upon the re-
138 See note 115 supra.
17Park & Tilford, Inc. v. Schulte, 160 F.2d 984 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 761
(1947).
138 Blau v. Hodgkinson, 100 F. Supp. 361 (S.D.N.Y. 1951), 52 Colum. L. Rev. 535
(1952).
.3 Cf. Blau v. Mission Corp., 113 F. Supp. 153 (S.D.N.Y. 1953), aff'd in part and
rev'd in part, 212 F.2d 77 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 1016 (1954).
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organization exchange.14 Should the Y stock be considered as con-
vertible X stock, then less difficulty is found in bringing a purchase
by the X insider of Y stock within the proscription of the section.
Difficulty may be encountered in determining whether this "con-
version" upon reorganization amounts to a "sale" which may be
matched against the initial purchase. However, a conversion normally
does amount to a "sale" as well as a "purchase" of the converted
stock.141
Difficulty also arises regarding those short-swing transactions
characterized by a purchase or sale of a security of one corporation
matched against a sale or purchase of a security of another which is
party to the reorganization. Here again, the act apparently requires
that the securities matched must be the same; and the case law requires
that they at least be of the same issuer. 4 It is questionable, then,
whether the section would embrace the situation in which an in-
sider of a disappearing corporation which is participating in a type
A merger or consolidation sells stock of that corporation prior to the
reorganization and subsequently purchases securities of the surviving
corporation within the prohibitive period. Clearly the situation pre-
sents an opportunity for abuses of the type which the section seeks
to curtail.4
Should the approach discussed (that the securities to be ex-
changed in a reorganization are to be considered convertible) be
utilized, two securities of different participants in a reorganization
may be logically matched against each other and thus come within
the terms of section 16 (b). In the example given, if the disappearing
corporation's security is considered as convertible then a sale of such
security prior to the reorganization may be tantamount to a sale
of the underlying security which can be matched against a later
purchase of that security."
Although it is conceded that this approach is a tenuous one, the
broad purpose of section 16(b) should be kept in mind. It is sub-
mitted that the approach is one which may comport with that pur-
pose. Any other rationalization will permit an insider to profit with
4 0 See Cook & Feldman, supra note 131, at 626.
141 With regard to Rule 16(b) and convertible securities see Parke & Tilford, Inc. v.
Schulte, 160 F.2d 984 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 761 (1947); Cook & Feldman,
supra note 131, at 624.
14' Rubin & Feldman, Unfair Use of Corporate Information, 95 U. Pa. L. Rev. 468, 486
(1947).
143 The rule states that it is enacted "for the purpose of preventing the unfair use of
information which may have been obtained by such beneficial owner, director, or officer by
reason of his relationship to the issuer .... " Exchange Act § 16(b).




impunity (except for lob-5 liability) through utilization of his
"insider" knowledge of a favorable future reorganization exchange.
Types E and F reorganizations may... or may not... involve a
"sale" or "purchase" for 16(b) purposes depending upon the par-
ticular facts involved. It may be argued that in the types D, E, or
F reorganizations the securities received are often the "economic
equivalent" of those relinquished and therefore no purchase or sale
is involved." 7 Because these transactions ordinarily involve an ex-
change of securities by a corporation and its shareholders in which
the proportionate interests of such shareholders remain fixed, the
economic equivalent argument is frequently raised and is seemingly
of some merit. The fact that the interests of the recipient stock-
holders remained unchanged after a reorganization was found to
be persuasive in one 16(b) situation"4 ' and insufficient to avoid
liability in at least two others. 4
The courts which have considered situations analogous to these
reorganizations, although establishing no clear cut guidelines, have
at least shown tendencies to be persuaded by certain factors. Suc-
cinctly stated, these are: (1) the existence of an insider's option
to acquire the securities as he sees fit; (2) the similarity and the
proportion of the insider's holdings before and after the reorganiza-
tion; (3) the presence of complete disclosure to all shareholders;
(4) the existence of a pre-existing market for the securities received;
and (5) the existence of possible abusive practices with regard to
inside information.' Although factor five is of great importance,
none is controlling, and perhaps the only accurate statement that may
be made is that any decision will be based upon the cumulative effect
of all of the existing factors.'
It seems that any transaction may come within section 16(b)
when it is capable of producing a marked change in the market prices
of the participating securities and when it readily lends itself to the
making of in-and-out profits by insiders. It has been suggested that
in these types of reorganizations there should be imposed something
14 Cf. Cook & Feldman, supra note 131, at 620 (Purchase of option considered purchase
of underlying security).
14 Blau v. Lehman, 173 F. Supp. 590 (S.D.N.Y. 1959), aff'd, 286 F.2d 786 (1960),
aff'd, 368 U.S. 403 (1962).
147 See Meeker & Conney, The Problem of Definition in Determining Insider Liabilities
Under Section 16(b), 45 Va. L. Rev. 949, 975 (1959).
148 Cf. Roberts v. Eaton, 212 F.2d 82 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 827 (1954), 53
Mich. L. Rev. 749 (1955).
149 Blau v. Mission Corp., 113 F. Supp. 153 (S.D.N.Y. 1953), aff'd in part and rev'd in
Part, 212 F.2d 77 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 1016 (1954); Blau v. Hodgkinson, 100
F. Supp. 361 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).




in the nature of a presumption that the statute is applicable. This
is both feasible and practical, and the case law seems to be moving
in that direction."'
Two exemptions to section 16 (b) are available in reorganizations.
The first, Rule 16(b)-6c, s3 exempts the disposition of a security
pursuant to a merger, consolidation, sale of assets, or reclassification
if the security was purchased either pursuant to the exercise of an
option or a similar right which was acquired more than six months
previous or pursuant to an employment contract consumated more
than six months before exercise of the option. Except for statutory
rights of dissenting shareholders, the reorganization must be bind-
ing on all shareholders of the issuer in order for this exemption to
apply.
Recognizing that certain reorganizations offer little opportunity
for profiting through inside information, the Commission has in
Rule 16(b)-754 exempted transactions pursuant to mergers, con-
solidations, or certain sales of assets when the disappearing corpora-
tion owned at least eighty-five per cent of the surviving corporation,
or where the corporation whose security is disposed of held over
eighty-five per cent of the combined assets of all the companies party
to the reorganization. This provision is conditioned on the insider's
not purchasing a security of one party to the reorganization and
selling that of another within a six month period which includes the
time of reorganization.
IV. CONCLUSION
It should be quite clear that the securities problems attending tax
reorganizations, though not insurmountable, are certainly formi-
dable. 55 Indeed, the possible liabilities are astounding. With this in
mind it is obvious that it will be an unwise counsel who permits tax
considerations to dominate a reorganization scheme completely and
heeds not at all the securities aspects. The advent of an extended
152 Meeker & Conney, supra note 147, at 978.
153 17 C.F.R. § 240.16b-6 (Supp. 1962); See Cook & Feldman, supra note 131, at 633.
'" 17 C.F.R. § 240.16b-7 (Supp. 1962).
... Almost all states have blue sky laws of one sort or another. Therefore, in any se-
curities transaction the local blue sky laws must also be considered. However, because of
their extreme variation it is felt that an analysis of their applicability to the tax reorganiza-
tions is best left to a separate study. It should be sufficient to say that in no more than
one-third of the states which have securities regulation provisions does there exist an ex-
emption specifically applicable to these reorganizations. For a detailed study of this problem
see Cowett, Reorganization, Consolidation, Mergers and Related Corporate Events Under the
Blue Sky Laws, 13 Bus. Law. 418 (1957).
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scope of liability under Rule 10b-5 and section 16(b) plus the
restricted protection now offered by Rule 133 indicates that here-
tofore tolerated abuses in this area will now be under scrutiny by not
only the Commission but the financial and legal communities as well.
